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Abstract
This special issue takes stock of recent post-Lisbon additions to the European Union’s
accountability toolkit. It provides indications that older decision-making tools tend to be
more accountable than newer ones, and that, in some areas, decision-making is shifting
towards less accountable arenas. This introductory article reviews the debate on the
gradual evolution of the European Union’s accountability system and introduces key
aspects of the post-Lisbon era that can be expected to affect accountability in the
European Union, and that have been overlooked by the literature thus far: delegated
acts, economic governance and regulatory evaluations. The contributions to this special
issue address each of these domains in detail and highlight the degree to which account-
ability has been enhanced. A final contribution shows how these arrangements fit into
the wider landscape of already-existing European Union accountabilities and how this
landscape has developed over time.
Points for practitioners
There is an apparent link between the relative novelty of the institutional setting in
which a governance system is embedded and its accountability. Settings that include a
strong role for the European Commission tend to be the most accountable ones, while
those that rely mostly on intergovernmental logics, including those that have been
created outside the Treaty framework, come with significant gaps.
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Introduction
Accountability is considered a cornerstone of democracy (Mulgan, 2003), and the
European Union (EU) has often been accused of showing shortages of account-
ability (e.g. Follesdal, 2006; Gustavsson et al., 2009; Juncos and Pomorska, 2011).
Originally, students of European integration portrayed the development of eﬀective
accountability in the EU as a futile undertaking – and state a strong ‘impossibility
thesis’. Accountability at the EU level was argued to be inconceivable given the
absence of a European demos (Gustavsson et al., 2009) and the presence of myriad
lower-level actors (Papadopoulos, 2010) and multiple principals exerting variant
pressures on agents (Dehousse, 2008; Kelemen, 2002).
Various recent empirical contributions have questioned these sobering expect-
ations, arguing that the set of accountability mechanisms in place in the EU has
grown increasingly dense (e.g. Bovens et al., 2010; Wille, 2013). Much of the empir-
ical basis of these studies dates from the pre-Lisbon period. This special issue shifts
focus to the functioning of accountability in the post-Lisbon area, covering trends
linked to the new treaty and beyond. Three characteristics of this period stand out.
First, adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, and the institutional changes adopted in its
wake, can be expected to have aﬀected accountability. Mainly, ‘Lisbon’ aimed at
strengthening the European and the national parliaments vis-a-vis both the Council
and the Commission. Second, various treaties outside the EU acquis have been
established in response to the ﬁnancial crisis, which confer new powers on existing
EU institutions outside the scope of the Lisbon Treaty. Third, in the wake of better
regulation programmes, the usage of ex post legislative evaluations (an instrument
introduced before) has received more attention by the Commission. The value
added of this special issue is that it goes beyond the studies that evaluate the
implications of the Lisbon Treaty on accountability alone. It puts the accountabil-
ity changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty into the broader context of treaty
changes, and devotes special attention to follow-up measures adopted in the wake
of the ﬁnancial crisis, outside of the scope of the Lisbon Treaty itself. In doing so,
this special issue zooms in on relevant empirical cases in order to investigate the
wider evolution of the EU’s accountability framework.
Empirical studies into accountability, including EU accountability, used to be
scarce, but for about a decade, their numbers have been on the rise. This resulted in
a modest set of snapshots of the state of accountability in particular cases, and
occasionally also in analyses that include a longitudinal component (e.g. Jantz and
Jann, 2013). However, it has proven hard to aggregate ﬁndings from individual
studies on accountability and present either a general diagnosis of the overall state
of accountability, or to discern trends in the development of accountability regimes
over time (cf. Bovens et al., 2014: 2, 6, 17, 649–682). Scholars have attributed this to
two factors: ﬁrst, there has been a tendency for students of accountability to keep
developing new deﬁnitions of accountability; and, second, consequently, concep-
tualizations of accountability that seek to capture the variety of accountability
instruments, as well as benchmarks for the appropriateness of those instruments,
also diﬀer (cf. Bovens et al., 2014: 3–15, Brandsma and Schillemans, 2013).
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In this special issue, we take this call for more cumulative research seriously. We
take stock of post-Lisbon additions to the EU’s accountability toolkit and assess
whether EU accountability has been strengthened. Our contribution is twofold:
ﬁrst, the studies in this special issue indicate that the trend towards more account-
ability at the European level (cf. Bovens et al., 2010) persists; and, second, they
provide indications that older regulatory and decision-making tools tend to be
more accountable than newer ones.
The introductory article sets the stage for this analysis by conceptualizing
accountability and reviewing the debate on the (im)possibility of accountability
in the EU’s governance system. The debate on the (im)possibility of accountability
serves to illustrate the evolution of EU accountability in face of the academic
debate that parallels it. After surveying existing empirical ﬁndings on the EU’s
gradually evolving accountability system, it discusses three recent institutional
changes and regulatory tools that are expected to aﬀect accountability in the
EU: delegated acts (Brandsma); economic governance (Naert); and regulatory
evaluations (Zwaan, Van Voorst and Mastenbroek). Against this background,
the fourth contribution (Wille) shows how these arrangements ﬁt into the wider
landscape of already-existing EU accountabilities and how this landscape has
developed over time.
Conceptualizing accountability
Conceptualizations of accountability abound. A multiplicity of theoretical contri-
butions ﬂesh out the meaning and origins of the term and discuss its relevance
for democracy (e.g. Behn, 2001; Black, 2008; Bovens, 2007; Mulgan, 2003).
Notwithstanding this conceptual heterogeneity, Bovens (2010: 948–54) identiﬁed
some family resemblance among the many deﬁnitions of accountability, which can
be organized into two main categories.
The ﬁrst category of conceptualizations – particularly used in the US – treats
accountability as a property of individuals or institutions. Accountability is asso-
ciated with being responsive and transparent. The second category – particularly
used in continental Europe – conceptualizes accountability as a mechanism by
which actors are held to account by forums, which they are obliged to explain
and justify their conduct to. The forums can ask questions, pass judgement and
impose consequences on the actor. According to this latter category, accountability
is functional for speciﬁc relationships between institutions or individuals.
Accountability is treated not as a virtuous property, but rather as a means of
connecting public agents to a variety of audiences, and is thus usually considered
a precondition for democratic legitimacy.
The latter type has commonly been used in recent studies of EU accountability
(e.g. Brandsma and Schillemans, 2013; Buess, 2015; Busuioc, 2013). We follow this
approach in this themed issue, understanding accountability ‘as a social ‘‘mechan-
ism’’ or an institutional relation or arrangement in which an agent can be held to
account by another agent or institution’ (Bovens, 2010: 948). More precisely, this
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theme adopts Bovens’s (2007: 450) widely applied conceptualization of account-
ability as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct; the forum can pose ques-
tions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences’. In analyses
of accountability, the focus may be on either formal obligations or the actual
behaviour of actors and forums.
Hard benchmarks for assessing the quality of an accountability arrangement
that are amenable to empirical investigation unfortunately do not exist.
Nonetheless, it is possible to evaluate accountability using a democratic, a consti-
tutional or a cybernetic perspective. According to the democratic perspective,
accountability shortages arise from insuﬃcient opportunities for the electorate,
through its elected representatives, to hold public actors accountable. From a con-
stitutional perspective, shortages arise from a lack of checks and balances (or a lack
of mutual dependencies, accordingly) between public institutions, failing to protect
the people from a ‘tyranny of the executive’. According to the cybernetic perspec-
tive, accountability is in deﬁcit when public institutions do not learn from past
mistakes.
Despite these three positive eﬀects that result from accountability, it would be a
mistake to conclude that more accountability is always better. Accountability
scholars repeatedly warn against overloads and conﬂicts resulting from a multipli-
city of accountability relationships in which public actors are embedded.
In extreme cases, multiple accountability disorder occurs. In EU governance,
the potential for conﬂicts between multiple arrangements is high. Often, both
supranational and intergovernmental accountability logics are at work simultan-
eously, which may turn the humble task of checking upon delegated activities into a
competence trench war between EU institutions and member states (Dehousse,
2008).
For the three empirical cases investigated in this special issue, we not only seek
to establish to what degree they are accountable; we also elucidate in this intro-
ductory article how this aﬀects the overall accountability of EU governance. Do
the recent changes to the EU’s accountability architecture provide for stronger or
weaker accountability overall?
EU accountability: Mission impossible?
As brieﬂy pointed out earlier, three arguments basically support the ‘impossibility
thesis’ that views accountability and EU governance as incompatible. All three
reasons can be linked to the deﬁning features – or, one may say, inevitable prob-
lems – of multi-level governance. It is worthwhile to repeat these three arguments in
the introductory article as they point to weaknesses in EU accountability.
The ﬁrst argument argues that the multitude of lower-level actors involved in EU
decision-making hinders accountability. The problem outlined is that the inclusion
of national authorities in transnational networks precludes accountability. These
networks, consisting of various national authorities interacting horizontally or
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under the auspices of EU institutions, involve diﬀerent and many more actors
than those traditionally conceived of in international decision-making. Often,
lower-level policy experts are involved in governance settings such as expert
groups (Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2011; Larsson, 2003), Open Method of
Coordination (OMC) networks (Borra´s and Jacobsson, 2004), the management
boards of supranational agencies (Flinders, 2004) or comitology committees
(Brandsma, 2013b; Egeberg et al., 2003). The fact that these governance structures
mostly deal with matters of low political salience and mostly have a technocratic
character enables actors to conceal their behaviour and, knowingly or unknow-
ingly, act against the preferences of their constituencies (Brandsma, 2010;
Papadopoulos, 2010: 1039). This eventually undermines pre-existing chains of
control (in a Weberian sense).
The second argument for the impossibility thesis refers to the voting rules used
in EU governance, which typically range from qualiﬁed majority voting to merely
giving input to EU institutions without voting. Unanimity rules are applied ever-
more rarely, which makes it unjustiﬁable to hold individual actors to account for the
content of a collective decision (Thompson, 1980). National authorities in the
Council are only able to individually and autonomously control decisions made
in a supranational setting if unanimity voting applies (Strøm et al., 2003: 744). In
most instances, the Council of Ministers uses qualiﬁed majority voting, as do other
EU bodies or forums composed of national actors (such as comitology). Other
forms of governance that do not include voting, such as the Open Method of
Coordination (OMC), use informal ways of producing eﬀects that may well include
the overruling of minority positions. In this sense, it has been argued that multi-
level governance encourages blame-shifting and dilutes responsibilities (Oliver,
2009: 13–14; Papadopoulos, 2010: 1033–1034), in particular, in situations where
the actual decision-making procedures are not transparent.
The third argument sustaining the impossibility of eﬀective accountability in EU
policymaking relates to the vast number of accountability forums as a result of the
EU’s multi-level distribution of powers. The European governance system does not
have an ideal-typical simple delegation structure; quite the contrary is the case.
Many actors in the European system have multiple principals, and each principal
tries to mould the set-up of systems that control the behaviour of actors to its own
exclusive needs (Dehousse, 2008; Kelemen, 2002). As a result, agents in EU deci-
sion-making may receive conﬂicting steering signals and accountability pressures.
On top of this, these principals are often located at diﬀerent levels in the system.
EU agencies, for instance, typically tend to be accountable to the EU Commission,
the European Parliament (EP), the EU Court of Auditors, the EU Court of Justice,
but also to their management boards, which are typically composed of member
state representatives working for national ministries. These persons, in turn, are
embedded in national hierarchies (Busuioc, 2013). In sum, EU governance settings
may be accountable to myriad forums, each having diﬀerent agendas and powers
(Papadopoulos, 2010: 1039; Vaubel, 2006). The vast number of forums thus nega-
tively impacts upon the quality of accountability processes.
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For these three main reasons, various authors have argued that the delegation of
policies to the EU has not only stretched lines of accountability, but also blurred
them (Agne´, 2009: 55; Palumbo, 2010: xii). Already before the enactment of the
Lisbon Treaty and the two related processes identiﬁed here (further treaty changes,
political programmes), the impossibility thesis was challenged. To evaluate
accountability in the EU post-Lisbon, it is relevant to take these arguments into
account because the outlined measures might have further strengthened existing
trends or added actual new responses.
Challenging the ‘impossibility thesis’
In recent years, several authors have challenged the thesis that EU accountability is
impossible – thus formulating what we will call the ‘possibility thesis’. First, the
central importance of accountability via national governmental representatives has
been put into perspective. As deplored by advocates of the impossibility thesis, the
accountability mechanisms in the EU system have become ever-less exclusive to
national governments. Yet, defenders of the impossibility thesis downplay the rele-
vance of accountability through the EP, which directly represents citizens. Over
time, the rise of the EP has made the EU’s system of checks and balances arguably
more complex, but it counterweighs the weakened accountability of national gov-
ernments. While the EP still does not possess all powers normally found in national
parliaments (Follesdal and Hix, 2006), above all, the formal right to initiate legis-
lation (Brandsma, 2013a), it has increasingly become a veritable co-legislator. Even
though voter turnout is relatively low and EP elections remain ‘second-order’ (Hix
and March, 2011), it does feature institutionalized mechanisms to hold the
European Commission accountable. The ﬁrst element of the ‘impossibility thesis’
is thus challenged by the development of other input-legitimizing channels and
constitutional checks and balances. This article – supported by the following con-
tributions – claims that this trend has been further strengthened in the post-Lisbon
framework. More so, in addition to strengthening checks and balances between EU
institutions, genuinely new control mechanisms have been introduced by creating
rights for national parliaments to hold the Commission responsible when it issues
legislative proposals (so-called yellow card), which also increases national parlia-
ments’ control over their own governments’ actions as parliaments now have their
own access to relevant information, and, in some areas, even control over actual
decision-making at the EU level (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty introduced control rights
for policing).
In face of the other two ‘impossibility’ arguments, alternative conceptualizations
of accountability processes have been proposed that do not demand a single,
centralized system, and argue that accountability can equally be produced in net-
worked or loosely coupled systems. Scott (2000: 54), for instance, argued that a
multiplicity of accountability forums does not necessarily come with conﬂicting
interests between them; in fact, when multiple forums with similar accountability
functions cooperate across levels, accountability becomes ‘redundant’. In addition,
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it has been shown that accountability forums have multiplied and taken on diﬀer-
entiated tasks rather than diluting accountability (cf. Bovens et al., 2010).
To give just two examples of this, the accountability deﬁcit can be challenged, in
particular, with a view to EU agencies and comitology. At the turn of the century,
the gradual rise of agencies was explained by the need to institutionalize speciﬁc
forms of expertise for the management of credible, technically complex policies. At
the same time, however, the fear was widespread that their formal independence
would create accountability deﬁcits, namely, agency drift because agencies would
not be eﬀectively held responsible (e.g. Shapiro, 1997). Recent empirical studies
have, however, oﬀered competing evidence. One is that many agencies are, in
practice, less independent than is suggested by their formally independent legal
personality. Directors and managers of agencies are under continuous pressure
from – mainly – the European Commission and the member states, which eﬀect-
ively control the agencies’ resources or take the ﬁnal policy decisions (Busuioc,
2009). Due to its continuous involvement in agency aﬀairs, the Commission eﬀect-
ively limits the discretionary space of the agencies, thus making them materially
dependent on the Commission (Wonka and Rittberger, 2010) – hinting to the fact
that agencies are eﬀectively held accountable. Second, as brieﬂy indicated earlier,
many agencies are, in fact, embedded in a dense web of accountability relation-
ships, including the EP, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice, the
Ombudsman, the Court of Auditors and the agencies’ own management boards
as forums. Accountability problems, if they appear at all, tend to arise not as a
result of a lack of accountability, or as a result of competition between forums, but
as a result of practicalities such as a lack of management expertise in management
boards or a lack of interest in the EP for discussing, for instance, the agencies’
annual reports (Busuioc, 2013). In short, there is no unaccountability by design,
not even due to overlapping accountability responsibilities.
The other example is the comitology system, which becomes ever-more account-
able over time. Comitology refers to a set of about 250 committees composed of
policy specialists from every member state, advising and often voting on executive
measures drafted by the Commission (e.g. Brandsma, 2013b). When the Council
and the EP pass legislation, they agree that many executive decisions should be
made down the line. Comitology has traditionally been the default option for
controlling those executive decisions, including member state civil servants, but
excluding the EP. One of the main accountability concerns was that the
Commission and the member states could potentially sneak politically relevant
issues into executive measures, bypassing the EP (He´ritier et al., 2012). Also,
before the turn of the century, the comitology system was almost completely secret-
ive. However, things have changed much for the better over the past 15 years.
Comitology is now subject to the same transparency rules as the Commission
(Dehousse, 2003), and the EP – as well as the Council of Ministers – has been
equipped with extensive veto rights applying to a large subset of executive measures
(Brandsma, 2013b; Neuhold, 2008). Again, adding to this trend, the Lisbon Treaty
has created full control rights for the Council and the EP, as opposed to member
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state expert committees, for a particular class of executive rules, namely, ‘delegated
acts’. The trend here, thus, is clearly towards stronger accountability at the EU
level, even though accountability within member states for the input given by
its policy specialists remains a matter for concern (Brandsma, 2010). In addition,
the distinction between delegated and implementing acts created some more legal
clarity on procedural decisions. Further examples could be added, but for the
purpose of this introductory article, it suﬃces to highlight that traditional control
instruments such as legal review, comitology and the EP’s power to dismiss the
Commission as a whole have been supplemented by transparency requirements,
performance reports at services level, more exposure of individual Commissioners
in parliamentary committees and informal agreements between the Commission
and the EP on the exchange of documents and the dismissal of individual
Commissioners (Brandsma, 2013a; Wille, 2013). As the literature that challenged
the ‘impossibility’ thesis shows, this issue is not new. The contribution of this
special issue is to go beyond the known mechanisms and highlight where these
have been further strengthened by the post-Lisbon measures, or even added quali-
tatively new elements.
To sum up, various recent empirical studies have provided evidence of the
increasing density of accountability relationships. These rest on strengthened
checks and balances between EU institutions, reformed transparency and account-
ability procedures, informal controls, and the expansion of control relationships
across levels and units in the system (most prominently involving national parlia-
ments). Even if the glass cannot be claimed to be anywhere near full, one may
conclude that it is ﬁlling up (cf. Bovens et al., 2010). Taking a broader look at not
only the Lisbon Treaty but also the follow-up measures it triggered, we hence
consider it timely for a further investigation of the evolving accountability land-
scape of EU governance.
EU accountability post-Lisbon
As shown, the changes introduced in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty are in line
with earlier trends and go beyond these. These concern changes to the institutional
landscape, including the competences of each institution, as well as regulatory
instruments that, often through participation and evaluation, seek to enhance
the accountability of EU decision-making towards citizens, stakeholders and EU
institutions. We now address these categories in turn and specify to what degree
existing studies provide indications of the eﬀect of these changes on the account-
ability of EU decision-making, and in which areas they do not.
The extension of the co-decision procedure towards yet further policy areas has
been one of the most prominent institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon
Treaty. This extension includes politically salient areas such as international trade
agreements and the common agricultural policy. On the one hand, this suggests an
increase in opportunities for public accountability because the EP has a stronger
tradition of open decision-making than the Council. On the other hand, the greater
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involvement of the EP also increases the need for negotiating political compromises
with the Council. Traditionally, this is done behind closed doors in informal tri-
logue meetings (De Ruiter and Neuhold, 2012). After a compromise has been
found, public meetings of the EP and the Council are only used for rubberstamp-
ing. The lack of public accountability of this decision-making process has often
been lamented (He´ritier and Reh, 2012; Lord, 2013; Stie, 2010), even though both
the Council and, increasingly, the EP have internal accountability mechanisms in
place to keep their chief negotiators in check (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood,
2015). The extension of co-decision may thus formally improve accountability
towards the EP and enhance its role as an accountability forum when overseeing
the implementation of EU law, but these gains may be reduced by the informal
procedures that are applied in the legislative process. Accordingly, a question to
evaluate overall accountability is how these counter-rotating developments
interact.
As a second important innovation, the Treaty established the European
External Action Service (EEAS). Here, it is not so much the accountability mech-
anisms that are new, but rather the organisational embedding of the EEAS. The
High Representative of Foreign Aﬀairs is a member both of the Commission and
of the Council, and the great majority of the EEAS’s tasks are not in the realm of
co-decision. Hence, one might argue that the EP is not a principal of the EEAS.
The budget and the organisational structure of the EEAS, however, are decided
under co-decision. Recent research has shown that the EP does not shy away from
using the few powers it has to establish accountability relations with the High
Representative, which vary greatly in strength depending on the policy at stake
and the degree to which it can be linked to policy areas decided under co-decision
(Raube, 2015). The EP is thus able to some degree to act as an accountability
forum for issue areas in which it has only few competences.
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty has established national parliaments as accountabil-
ity forums. The ‘early warning procedure’ has provided parliaments with a direct
say in EU policymaking. It has granted them the right to assess whether legislative
proposals by the Commission are in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity. If
more than a third of national parliaments adopt a Reasoned Opinion judging
negatively about subsidiarity aspects, the Commission must reconsider its
proposal. Even though criticism abounds in the literature (De Wilde, 2012;
Kiiver, 2012), recent research also shows the political potential of the early warning
procedure (Bellamy and Kro¨ger, 2014; Kiiver, 2012). According to Cooper (2012),
it can positively contribute to the deliberative function of parliaments. A recent
study has indicated some cautious (side) eﬀects. Despite the lukewarm approach to
the early warning procedure by the Commission and EP, the European
Commission is alleged to pay more attention to subsidiarity because of it, and it
has arguably enhanced EU awareness and EU scrutiny in various parliaments
(Mastenbroek et al., 2014: 20–21).
Turning to decision-making procedures, existing ambitions to foster citizen par-
ticipation in EU governance are now also explicitly referred to in the Treaty, which
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at least suggests that transparency and public scrutiny are deemed politically more
important (Alemanno, 2014). Civil society inclusion – and, hand in glove, making
the decision-making process itself (i.e. as ‘throughput’) more accountable – has
already been a major objective of the European Commission before (Heidbreder,
2012), most importantly in opening up its legislative role – notably, in the online
consultation regime (Quittkat and Kohler-Koch, 2013). However, much of what
the Commission has promoted in terms of inclusive policymaking in its governance
White Paper (European Commission, 2001) has not passed the empirical test
(Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013). Its comprehensive 2015 initiative on better
lawmaking further underscores open government as a key ambition (European
Commission, 2015). Again, we can observe how certain trends have been taken
up in diﬀerent arenas and by varying measures. While the Lisbon Treaty intro-
duced institutional changes to allow for Citizen Initiatives, in particular, the
Commission agenda embraced by President Juncker under the REFIT initiative
moves the issue further and in a slightly diﬀerent direction. Under the REFIT
programme, civil society is drawn into public consultations and other exchanges
without any real impact, except for giving legitimacy to ﬁnal decisions that they
cannot really inﬂuence (Rena, 2015).
In sum, for the aforementioned areas, the literature oﬀers some clues as to where
accountability is heading. As the discussion of the (im)possibility thesis showed,
changes go beyond these trends but we still know little to nothing about the eﬀects
of these changes. As regards the institutional fabric of the EU, this applies in
particular to the system governing economic and monetary governance that was
introduced in response to the ﬁscal crisis. Two legal sources matter in this realm:
new intergovernmental treaties (e.g. the ‘Fiscal Compact’) that are outside the EU
treaties and hence circumvent all procedural rules and checks and balances
strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty; and new EU legislation, including not least
the establishment of a Banking Union. Notably, especially during the ﬁrst phase of
the ﬁscal crisis, the European Council and the Eurogroup acted outside EU pro-
cedures. In the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, for instance, the
Commission assumes a strong role in monitoring and coordinating, but formal
sanctions can only be issued by the European Council (Buti and Carnot, 2012).
The Banking Union, in contrast, has marked the most expansive treaty change
since the Treaty of Maastricht. We still lack an overview of whether the massive
number of institutional changes – in and outside the ordinary related to economic
and monetary governance, such as the set-up of the European Stability
Mechanism, the Banking Union, the increased role of the European Council and
the Eurogroup – resulted in accountable decision-making in this technically highly
complex realm.
However, institutional powers have also changed within the realm of ‘ordinary
EU politics’, of which the accountability eﬀects have not yet been investigated.
Notably, the regime of delegating executive powers to the Commission has chan-
ged, explicitly seeking to improve accountability for those powers. Before Lisbon,
delegated executive powers were controlled by comitology committees of member
630 International Review of Administrative Sciences 82(4)
state representatives, largely bypassing the EP. The Lisbon Treaty, however, intro-
duced a distinction between ‘delegated acts’ and ‘implementing acts’, which are
controlled diﬀerently: a slightly amended form of comitology for implementing
acts, but full veto and revocation powers for the EP and the Council without
comitology committees for delegated acts. The diﬀerence between these two
regimes has already given rise to many conﬂicts between the two EU legislators
about the choice of which regime to apply when new legislation delegates executive
powers to the Commission (Brandsma and Blom-Hansen, 2015). However, the
eﬀects of the new delegated acts regime on the degree to which the Commission
is held to account remains unclear. Vetoes on delegated acts have been very rare
(Kaeding and Stack, forthcoming), but it is yet unclear whether this means that the
Council and the EP genuinely agree on the contents of delegated acts or whether
they apply their powers as accountability forums sloppily now that the new system
is in place. In other words, the apparent or intended impact of the Lisbon changes
is not necessary the eﬀect it is unfolding, calling for more empirical research that
also takes in account related developments.
One of these parallel developments is the Commission’s attempt to reduce the
amount of legislation and focus more on its quality instead. These eﬀorts already
entered the political scene in the run-up to the failed Constitutional Treaty, but
these have been considerably strengthened after the Lisbon Treaty came into force
and, in particular, after the Juncker Commission took oﬃce. Regulatory evalu-
ations feature prominently in the current agenda of better regulation, although
their production has been nowhere near systematic (Mastenbroek et al., this
issue). Primarily, ex post regulation evaluations have the potential to provide an
important knowledge basis for accountability towards the EP about Commission
behaviour and results.
In sum, various institutional developments and new regulatory practices bear
evidence of the evolution of the EU’s accountability architecture that may have
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the actual working of accountability in the EU and, accord-
ingly, the empowering of particular institutions therein. Newly introduced account-
ability instruments do not replace the pre-existing order, but rather supplement and
extend it. The articles in this themed issue investigate these new instruments, and
show how these ﬁt into the general accountability landscape of EU governance at
the present day.
Introducing the special issue
The following contributions provide empirical accounts of recent changes to the
accountability landscape of the EU, originating in the Lisbon Treaty plus the
political and policy follow-up dynamics. Since there has been considerable concep-
tual heterogeneity in studies of accountability, cumulative research is scarce, so
present ﬁndings can mostly only be compared generically rather than systematically
to those of the past (Bovens et al., 2014: 1–17, 649–682). The contributions in the
special issue all aim to add to the extended empirical and conceptual debate on EU
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accountability, namely, by investigating how to deal with multiple cross-level actor
networks, overlapping responsibility in polycentric systems and multiple and over-
lapping accountability forums. Identifying how far pre-existing trends are rein-
forced and complemented or even extended by innovative instruments also
contributes to the conceptual contribution of the special issue because it leads to
a re-evaluation of multi-level policymaking conditions for accountability.
Naert assesses the accountability of EU economic governance as it developed
during the so-called euro crisis. Although this policy area very much remains the
domain of the European Council, and more in particular the Eurogroup,
and establishes such a least-likely case for accountability, the EP and the
Commission are involved to a certain degree. Naert presents a detailed inventory
of the power shifts involved, and concludes that the uploading of policies towards
the EU level and limiting policy discretion by specifying detailed rules did not solve
agency problems. In fact, many accountability processes have shifted from open,
democratic arenas to secluded networks of expert peers. In the larger framework of
the post-Lisbon setting, this leads to the conclusion that – contrary to the intended
direction of the institutional treaty changes – the strengthening of the European
Council and the external policy developments have signiﬁcantly weakened account-
ability under the democratic as well as the constitutional perspective.
Brandsma investigates the accountability of delegated legislation, in particular,
the role of the EP as an accountability forum. Delegated legislation is a new legal
instrument introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in which the Council and the EP may
delegate quasi-legislative powers to the European Commission while retaining full
control over its outputs through extensive veto rights. Brandsma shows that, com-
pared to predecessors of the delegated legislation regime, accountability has grown
stronger than ever before. In anticipation of possible vetoes, the European
Commission and the EP exchange their views early on in the process so that the
eventual delegated act survives legislative scrutiny. However, due to the large
number and detailed contents of delegated acts, the EP mostly relies on its own
administrators in order to ﬂag salient issues. In the realm of delegated acts, we
therefore observe that democratic accountability has been strengthened, but that
some challenges still remain as the post-Lisbon exercise of changed rules does not
match the intentions of the institutional changes one to one. It leads to a shift to the
informal realm, on the one hand, and to the EP bureaucracy, on the other, reducing
transparency.
Zwaan, Van Voorst and Mastenbroek also hone in on the role of the EP as an
accountability forum, analysing the role of ex post regulatory evaluations produced
by the Commission. As part of its desire to map out the eﬀectiveness of EU
policies, the EU institutions have agreed to let the Commission produce evalu-
ations when legislation has been in force for a certain number of years. Even
though these evaluations would allow the EP to hold the Commission accountable,
the results call for more sobering expectations: the EP uses evaluations primarily
for a forward-looking, agenda-setting purpose, instead of enquiring into the
Commission’s past performance. It does not therefore use the potential for
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learning, as is underscored by the cybernetic perspective on accountability, and
neither is it used as a tool to check whether popular preferences have been trans-
lated into policy, which is central to the democratic perspective.
Wille, ﬁnally, presents an overall picture of the development of accountability of
the European Commission from its inception to the present day. Rather than
investigating one mode of accountability, or focusing on one particular legitimizing
logic, Wille presents a complex web of accountability, including its dynamics,
inconsistencies and interrelations between accountability relationships. The slow
but sure parliamentarization of the EU, new modes of regulation and governance,
and the accompanying changes in the norms guiding the behaviour of institutions
have brought about an ever-denser web of accountability relationships. Speciﬁc
accountability mechanisms were created to meet speciﬁc demands at speciﬁc times,
which entails that the current set-up of the full EU accountability landscape lacks
a dominant organizing logic.
However, putting all contributions in relation, the collected ﬁndings call
for caution. Their contribution beyond the existing studies is clearly the insight
that, on the one hand, the institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty tackle all
three problems spelled out by the proponents of the impossibility thesis. On the
other hand, going beyond Lisbon and taking into account how the institutional
changes both work in practice and have been inﬂuenced especially by the various
policy ‘crises’ calls for a much more critical evaluation of the actual eﬀect of the
accountability-enhancing measures. The current accountability regime in the EU
remains a patchwork of intergovernmental, supranational and regulatory instruments
with overlapping spheres of application, lacking a clear organizing logic – in particu-
lar, when newer decision-making areas are concerned. This said, the discrepancy
indicated in a number of the present contributions may be a matter of transition.
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